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1 Introduction
Human languages contain a wide range of phenomena for grammatically
signalling relationships between clausal and sentential elements. A
subclass of these, such as agreement, pronominalization, reflexivization,
switch reference, and others, can be termed NP referential coding phe-
nomena since information referring to particular attributes (e.g. person,
number) of NPs is morphologically coded on other elements in the clause
or sentence. Most often such referential coding is conceived of as a
syntactic process since the rules required for these codings are generally
sensitive to the grammatical properties of the NPs they reference, properties
such as grammatical relation, person, number, gender, case, and others.
While in many cases a purely syntactic account of referential coding
phenomena can provide an adequate and insightful account of the data,
such is not always the case. In the present paper I examine certain verb
agreement and switch reference data from Choctaw, a Muskogean language,
which show that syntactic information must be augmented with semantic
information in order to adequately account for the data. In particular,
in these data possessors may optionally supersede inalienably possessed
body parts as the NPs referenced by the appropriate coding rules.
2 Verb Agreement in Choctaw
Subjects, direct objects, indirect objects, and beneficiaries can
all be marked on the predicate of the clause in which they occur. l
For the most part, this can be described as follows:
(1) Verb Agreement Rules 2
a. Subjects determine nominative agreement.
b. Direct objects determine accusative agreement.
c. Indirect objects determine dative agreement.
d. Beneficiaries determine benefactive agreement.
This agreement is illustrated in the clauses in (2)_(4).3
(2) Chi-bashli-li-tok.
2Acc-cut-lNom-Pst
'I cut you.'
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(3) Holisso chim-a:-li-tok.
book 2Dat-give-INo~Pst
'I gave the book to you.'
(4) AlIa ofi ~m~ lhioli-li-tok.
child dog 3Ben chase-INom-Pst
'I chased the dog for the child. r
In (2) the subject, whose nonoccurring pronominal form is ano '1',4
determines the first person singular nominative morpheme Ii, and the
direct object, whose nonoccurring pronominal form is chishno 'you',
determines the second person singular accusative morpheme chi. In (3)
we again have the first person singular nominative morpheme marking the
subject and a 0-morpheme marking the third person accusative agreement
determine by holisso 'book'.5 In addition, the indirect object is
marked by a second person singular dative morpheme chim. The clause in
(4) illustrates benefactive agreement; the third person beneficiary,
alIa 'child', determines the third person benefactive morpheme imi. In
all cases the morphemes must occur in the verbal complex (the verb plus
inflectional markers) in order for the clauses to have the desired mean-
ings, i.e., verb agreement is obligatory.
In each of the clauses in (2)-(4), the agreement morphemes which
occur in the verbal complex mark the person and number of the NPs in
the clause which trigger the agreement. However, the situation is more
complex when considering clauses which have a possessed body part as
subject or direct object.
(5) a. Sa-yyi-t basha.
IPoss-foot-Nom cut
'My foot is cut.'
b. Sa-yyi-t sa-basha.
IPoss-foot-Nom lAce-cut
'My foot is cut./I am cut on my foot.'
(6) a. Chi-nishkin-a-t hottopa-h-o?
2Poss-eye-Dt-Nom hurt-Pred-Q
'Do your eyes hurt?'
b. Chi-nishkin-a-t chi-hottopa-h-o?
2Poss-eye-Dt-Nom 2Acc-hurt-Pred-Q
'Do your eyes hurt?/Do you hurt in your eyes?'
(7) a. Ofi-t sa-bbak kopcli-tok.
dog-Nom IPoss-hand bite-Pst
'The dog bit my hand. '
b. Ofi-t sa-bbak sa-kopoli-tok.
dog-Nom IPoss-hand IAcc-bite-Pst
'The dog bit my hand./The dog bit me on my hand.'
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In the ~ clauses in (5)-(7) we get the expected agreement morphemes.
In each case there is a third person singular NP determining agreement,
which occurs as a 0-morpheme. However, in the l clauses there is what
appears to be an accusative morpheme agreeing in person and number with
the possessor of each of the body parts. The problem then is to account
for the accusative morphemes in the verbal complexes in (5b), (6b), and
(7b) •
One important question to consider is whether or not the accusa-
tive morphemes in the relevant clauses are agreement morphemes.
One might hypothesize that the possessive prefixes have simply been
copied onto the predicates of these clauses. However, such an analysis
is ruled out by data such as that in (8) and (9).
(8) a. Issoba-t am-ashaka habli-tok.
horse-Nom lPoss-behind kick-Pst
'The horse kicked my behind. '
b. Issoba-t am-ashaka sa-habli-tok.
horse-Nom lPoss-behind lAcc-kick-Pst
'The horse kicked my behind./The horse kicked me
in my behind. '
(9) a. Am-anokfila-t okpolo.
lPoss-think-Nom broken
'My mind is troubled.'
b. Am-anokfila-t si-okpolo.
lPoss-think-Nom lAce-broken
'My mind is troubled./I am troubled in my mind.'
In (8) the direct object is a possessed body part, am-ashaka 'my behind'.
Here the first person possessive prefix is am, the prefix generally used
to show inalienable possession. 6 The hypothesis which claims that the
accusative morphemes in (5b), (6b), and (7b) are copies of the possessive
prefix predicts that the morpheme marking the possessor in the verbal
complex in both (8b) and (9b) should be am. However, the morpheme which
in fact occurs is the first person singular accusative morpheme. This
fact (in addition to s,vitch reference data considered in §3) casts doubt
on the copying analysis.
The analysis I propose is that Choctaw speakers perceive body
parts as symbolic of the whole being. That is, if a single part of an
animate being is affected by some action or state, the whole being is
so affected. Therefore, the possessor of a body part may determine agree-
ment in the place of the body part. Under this analysis, the accusative
markers which occur in the E. clauses in (5)-(9) are agreement markers
determined by the possessors of the body parts.
One argument for this analysis is that the agreement normally
determined by NPs in these environments is accusative agreement.
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One expects accusative agreement with direct objects given the rule in
(1), as in (10) and (11).
(10) Ofi-t sa-kopoli-tok.
dog-Nom lAcc-bite-Pst
'The dog bit me. '
(11) Issoba-t sa-habli-tok.
horse-Nom 1Acc-kick-Pst
'The horse kicked me. '
In both (10) and (11) the direct object is marked by the first person
singular accusative morpheme~. Compare these to (7b) and (8b), in
which a body part functioning as direct object has a first person sin-
gular possessor and there is a first person singular accusative agree-
ment morpheme in the verbal complex. Since accusative agreement is
expected with direct objects, accusative morphemes in (7b) and (8b) are
consistent with an analysis in which possessors can take the place of
body parts in the determination of agreement.
Likewise, subjects of clauses containing the predicates basha
'cut' and hottopa 'hurt' determine accusative agreement.
(12) Sa-basha
lAcc-cut
'I am cut.'
(13) Chi-hottopa-h-o?
2Acc-hurt-Pred-Q
'Are you hurt?'
In both (12) and (13) the subject of the clause is marked by an accusa-
tive agreement morpheme, sa 'lAcc' in (12) and chi '2Acc' in (13). At
first this seems to contradict the agreement generalization in (1) that
subjects determine nominative agreement. However, I have argued else-
where (Davies 1981a) that the subjects of clauses such as (12) and (13)
are actually direct objects at the initial level of structure and sub-
jects at the final level of structure, what is referred to as an unac-
cusative structure in the relational grammar literature (Perlmutter
1978, Perlmutter and Postal 1978). The accusative agreement marking is
consistent with the unaccusative analysis since the NPs in (12) and (13)
are direct objects at the initial level of structure. 7 Since accusative
agreement is expected with the subjects of basha and hottopa, the
accusative morphemes in (5b) and (6b) are consistent with the analysis
in whichfue possessor of a body part can optionally be referenced by
agreement. The fact that these accusative morphemes occur only in
environments in which one expects accusative agreement indicates that
the morphemes may well be agreement morphemes.
An alternative accout of the fact that the possessors in (5b),
r
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(6b), and (9b) determine agreement is that they are actually the subjects
of their respective clauses. At first blush, one might consider the
English translations supporting evidence. However, if this were the
case, one would have to account for the fact that the body parts in these
clauses are marked for nominative case. In Choctaw, only subjects can
take nominative case marking (cf. Davies 1981a), and clauses in which
these body parts are not marked for nominative case are ungrammatical.
(5) b' .*Sa-yyi sa-basha.
(6) b'.*Chi-nishkin chi-hottopa-h-o?
(9) b' .*Am-anokfila si-okpolo.
Therefore, the body parts must be considered subjects, and one would be
forced to propose an analysis in which both the body part and its pos-
sessor function as grammatical subjects. Such an analysis is not wholly
dissimilar to that I wish to propose, i.e., if the body part is the sub-
ject and is symbolic of the entire possessor, the possessor is in a
sense also conceived of as the subject. However, the p~oposed analysis
differs in that there is no claim that the possessor is a grammatical
subject, only that the agreement is optionally triggered by it.
Additional evidence that the morpheme is indeed an agreement
marker comes from a special construction in Choctaw. In certain Choctaw
clauses it is possible for what appears to be a direct object to deter-
mine dative agreement. This is illustrated in the clause pairs in (14)
and (15).
(14) a. Chi-alikchi-li-tok.
2Acc-doctor-lNom-Pst
'I doctored you.'
b. Chim-alikchi-li-tok.
2Dat-doctor-lNom-Pst
'I doctored you.'
(15) a. Issoba shilli-li-tok.
horse comb-lNo~Pst
'I combed the horse.'
b. Issoba r-shilli-li-tok.
horse 3Dat-comb-lNo~Pst
'I combed the horse.'
In (14a) and (15a), as expected, the direct objects are marked on the
predicate by accusative agreement morphemes, chi '2Acc' and a 0-morpheme,
respectively. However, in the b clauses the same NPs are marked by the
dative agreement morphemes chim-'2Dat' and r '3Dat'. Elsewhere (Davies
1981a, 1982) I have argued that clauses such as (14b) and (15b) have a
structure in which an initial direct object demotes to indirect object.
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This accounts for the dative agreement morphemes and other facts which
need not concern us here. 8
Consider the clauses in (16).
(16) a. Oho:yo-t sa-ppashi
woman-Nom 1Poss-hair
'The woman combed my
b. Oho:yo-t sa-ppashi
woman-Nom IPoss-hair
'The woman combed my
shilli-tok.
comb-Pst
hair. '
I-shilli-tok.
3Dat-comb-Pst
hair. '
c. Oho:yo-t sa-ppashi a-shilli-tok.
woman-Nom 1Poss-hair 1Dat-comb-Pst
'The woman combed my hair. '
In (16a) sa-ppashi 'my hair' is a final direct object and determines
the expected third person accusative agreement 0-morpheme. In (16b)
sa-ppashi determines a third person dative agreement morpheme i, sig-
nalling that it has demoted to indirect object. However, in the verbal
complex in (16c) we find a first person singular dative agreement mor-
pheme, a, which agrees in person and nubmer with the possessor of the
body part. We can account for this as a case in which sa-ppashi 'my
hair' has demoted to indirect object and its possessor then determines
agreement in the verbal complex. As we have seen in (14b), (lSb), and
(16b), in this environment dative agreement is expected. Therefore,
the clause in (16c) provides an argument for considering this morpheme
to be an agreement morpheme. 9
Another argument for the proposed semantic analysis is the fact
that this additional agreement option is possible only when the pos-
sessed noun is an inalienably possessed body part. Possessors of
alienably possessed nouns *(17b) and possessors of kin terms *(18b)
cannot determine agreement.
(17) a. Issoba-t am-ofi habli-tok.
horse-Nom 1Poss-dog kick-Pst
'The horse kicked my dog.'
b.*Issoba-t am-ofi sa-habli-tok.
(18) a. Ofi-t si-oshi kopoli-tok.
dog-Nom 1Poss-son bite-Pst
'The dog bit my son.'
b.*Ofi-t si-oshi sa-kopoli-tok.
The ungrammaticality of *(17b) and *(18b) is attributable to the fact
that the possessor has determined an accusative agreement morpheme in
the verbal complex.
I
In addition, possessors of alienably possessed body parts cannot
determine agreement. ~~en a body part which normally takes a possessive
prefix from the set of prefixes which correspond to the accusative
agreement morphemes takes a possessive prefix from the set of prefixes
which correspond closely to dative agreement morphemes, the possessor
is perceived as owning the body part, i.e., possession is alienable,
not inalienable. In (19) am-iyyi talhlha:pi 'my five legs' refers to
legs that I own, not to legs attached to my body.
(19) a. Am-iyyi talhlha:pi aIpa asha:chi-li-tok.
IPoss-leg five table put-lNom-Pst
'I put my five legs on the table.'
b.*Am-iyyi talhlha:pi alpa asha:chi-li-tok.
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When the possessor of an alienably possessed body part determines agree-
ment, as in *(19b), the clause is ungrammatical.
The fact that only possessors of inalienably possessed body parts
can optionally determine agreement supports the proposed semantic anal-
ysis. One might well ask why only this limited class of possession
should be involved; any possession can hypothetically be viewed as an
extension of the possessor. However, in the real world it is the case
that when something is true of an item which is "physically attached"
to the possessor, by extension the same is true of the possessor. When
a person's hand is cut, it is also true that that person is cut. When
a person's head aches, that person in fact aches. The reference to
the body part merely further specifies the particular part of a person
for which an event or state is predicated. Such an extension seems
intuitively less plausible when the item for which an event or state is
predicated is not physically a part of the possessor. Therefore, the
data indicate that in the Choctaw world view any body part is indeed
symbolic of the entire being of which it is a part.
3 Switch Reference
Another form of referential coding in Choctaw is the switch refer-
ence system, which morphologically distinguishes whether or not clause
pairs have coreferential subjects. The view of a body part as symbolic
of the whole being is manifested once again.
Switch reference marking in Choctaw generally follows the rule
in (20).
(20) Switch Reference Marking10
a. Same-subject (55) marking occurs if the subject of
clause A is coreferential with the subject of clause B.
b. Switch-reference (SR) marking occurs if the subject
of clause A is not coreferential with the subject of
clause B.
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Switch reference marking is illustrated in (21) and (22).
(21) a. Ofi poshohli-li-cha tamaha ia-li-tok.
dog rub-1Nom-SS town go-lNom-Pst
'I patted the dog and went to town.'
b.*Ofi poshohli-li-na tamaha ia-li-tok.
SR
(22) a. Tobi apa-li-na tachi ish-pa-tok.
beans eat-INom-SR corn 2Nom-eat-Pst
'I ate beans, and you ate corn.'
b.*Tobi apa-li-cha tachi ish-pa-tok.
SS
In (21) the subject of each clause is 'I' and coordination can be marked
with the S5 suffix cha (21a) but not the SR suffix na *(21b). Conversely,
in (22) the subject of the first clause is 'I' and the subject of the
second is 'you'; here SR marking occurs (22a) but SS marking cannot
*(22b).
However, when a body part is the subject of a clause and the sub-
ject of the other clause is the possessor of the body part, either SS
or SR marking is possible.
(23) a. Sa-nishkin-a-t hottopa-na okhlsh chopa-li-tok.
IPoss-eye-Dt-Nom hurt-SR medicine buy-INom-Pst
'My eyes hurt, so I bought some medicine. '
b. Sa-nishkin-a-t hottopa-cha okhlsh chopa-li-tok.
1Poss-eye-Dt-Nom hurt-SS medicine buy-INom-Pst
'My eyes hurt, so I bought some medicine. '
(24) a. Oka 1awa tahli-li-na sa-ttakoba-t hottopa.
water much finish-INom-SR IPoss-stomach-Nom hurt
'I had a lot of water, and my stomach hurts.'
b. Oka lawa tahli-li-cha sa-ttakoba-t hottopa.
water much finish-INom-SS IPoss-stomach-Nom hurt
'I had a lot of water, and my stomach hurts. '
(25) a. Sa-ppashi-t lakna-ka
IPoss-hair-Nom yellow-Comp=SR
'I know my hair is yellow.'
b. Sa-ppashi-t lakna-ka-t
1Poss-hair-Nom yellow-Comp-SS
'I know my hair is yellow.'
ikha :na-li.
know-lNom
ikha:na-li.
know-lNom
(23) and (24) show that the body part can occur in either the first or
second of two conjoined clauses. In (25) the possessor is the subject
of the matrix clause and the body part is the subject of the embedded
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clause.
The analysis which allows a body part to be symbolic of the entity
of which it is a part allows an account of these otherwise problematic
data. The SR marking on the first clause in (23a), (24a), and (25a) is
accounted for by the rule in (20b). Since in each sentence the subject
of one clause is a body part and the subject of the other is 'I', the
subjects are not coreferent and SR marking follows. However, in each
of the b sentences the first clause has SS marking. If the body part
is taken as symbolic of the possessor and the rule in (20) is sensitive
to the possessor (and not the body part), the subjects of the two
clauses are both 'I' in each case. therefore, the subjects of the
clauses are coreferent, satisfying (20a), and SS marking occurs. As in
the case of possessors determining agreement, referencing the possessor
by the switch reference rule is optional.
Similar phenomena have been noted in other languages. Marlett
(1981) reports that in Seri, a Hokan language of northwestern Mexico,
certain body parts or references to a person appear to be referential of
the entire person. In sentences in which one of these nouns occurs as
the subject of a clause, switch reference (change of referent) is not
marked on the dependent clause when the subject of the following clause
is the possessor of that noun, as in (26).
(26) ?asaiti kap ?i-mos
gasoline the my-heart
'My heart fell on (=1
kW-t-oit 0
30bl-mood-descend same
remembered) the ga~
i ?-y-iXt.
I-mood-take
took it.'
However, the Seri phenomenon is not as widespread as that in Choctaw.
For example, (27) would be ungrammatical without the switch-reference
marker, i.e., the body part, 'hand', is not taken as symbolic of the
entire being.
(27) mi-nt ki?
your-hands the
'If your hands
po-gatX ta-X im-s-o:?a
mood-thorny different-UT your-mood-cry
get thorns in them, you will cry. '
?a-?a.
Aux-Decl
Payne (1980) also reports similar data in Chickasaw, the Musko-
gean language most closely related to Choctaw. She claims that when an
inalienably possessed noun is the subject of a clause in a sentence, if
the subject of the other clause is the possessor of that noun either
same-referent (SR) marking can occur, as in (28a), or different-refer-
ent (DR) marking can occur, as in (28b).
(28) a. Sa-sipokni taha-hma-t sa-hakshop-at banata
IsgP-old finish-Med-SR lsgP-skin-Sub wrinkled
'When I'm old, my skin will be wrinkled.'
b. Sa-sipokni taha-hma sa-hakshop-at banata
1sgP-old finish-Med=DR 1sgP-skin-Sub wrinkled
'When I'm old, my skin will be wrinkled.'
taha.
finish
taha.
finish
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All of the examples cited by Payne include possessed body parts, so the
Chickasaw strategy may well be the same as that in Choctaw.
Further, the Choctav data indicate that there is no correlation
between exercising the options to reference the possessor for agreement
or switch reference. The data in (23)-(25) show that the possessor can
be referenced for switch reference in the absence of agreement with the
possessor. Further evidence of the independence of choice is shown in
the sentences in (29), which are counterparts of (23) in which the pos-
sessor determines agreement in the first clause.
(29) a. Sa-nishkin-a-t sa-hottopa-na okhlsh chopa-li-tok.
IPoss-eye-Dt-Nom lAcc-hurt-SR medicine buy-INom-Pst
'My eyes hurt, so I bought some medicine. '
b. Sa-nishkin-a-t sa-hottopa-cha okhlsh chopa-li-tok.
IPoss-eye-Dt-Nom lAcc-hurt-SS medicine buy-INom-Pst
'My eyes hurt, so I bought some medicine.'
Importantly, even if the possessor determines agreement, SR marking is
possible, (29a).
Additionally, if the specific body part is not explcitly referred
to, both options are still available to speakers.
(30) a. Hottopa-na alikchi ia-li-tok.
hurt-SR doctor go-INo~Pst
'It hurt, so I went to the doctor.'
b. Hottopa-cha alikchi ia-li-tok.
hurt-SS doctor go-INom-Pst
'It hurt, so I went to the doctor.'
c. Sa-hottopa-na alikchi ia-li-tok. 11
lAcc-hurt-SR doctor go-lNom-Pst
'I/it hurt, so I went to the doctor.'
d. Sa-hottopa-cha alikchi ia-li-tok.
lAcc-hurt-SS doctor go-lNom-Pst
'I/it hurt, so I went to the doctor.'
The switch reference data in which the possessor of a body part
is referenced for SS marking provides an additional argument against
the analysis considered briefly in §2 in which both the body part and
the possessor were grammatical subjects of the same clause. In the
sentences in (23b), (24b), and (25b) the possessor of a body part is
considered by the switch reference rule and SS marking results. One
might again wish to argue that in fact since both SS and SR marking are
possible that both the body part and its possessor are grammatical
subjects in the same clause. However, such an analysis is not tenable
in this case. Crucially, even when considered the subject for switch
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reference marking, the possessors in these clauses do not determine
agreement in the verbal complexes of their respective clauses. As was
mentioned earlier in §2, agreement in Choctaw is obligatory. If these
possessors were to be considered subjects of these clauses, they would
have to determine agreement. Since they do not, they cannot be consid-
ered subjects. Therefore, the switch reference data support the con-
tention that referential coding rules can be sensitive to possessors of
body parts since the body parts are symbolic of the entire possessor.
4 Conditions on Optional Reference
Having established the semantic contribution to these largely
syntactic referential coding mechanisms, the question remains as to
the necessary conditions for employing the particular agreement and
switch reference options. I first make explicit one syntactic condition
on these phenomena and then address the larger question of variability.
Not all possessors12 may determine agreement. In the examples in
§2, the body parts are all direct objects at some level of structure. 13
When the body part is the subject of an unergative clause (an intran-
sitive clause in which the subject is a subject at all levels of struc-
ture (Perlmutter 1978, Perlmutter and Postal 1978», the possessor can-
not determine agreement.
(31) a. Sa-yyi-t hilha-tok.
lPoss-foot-Nom dance-Pst
'My feet danced.'
b.*Sa-yyi-t hilha-li-tok. 14
lPoss-foot-Nom dance-1Nom-Pst
('My feet danced. ')
c.*Sa-yyi-t sa-hilha-tok.
1Poss-foot-Nom 1Acc-dance-Pst
('My feet danced. ')
In *(31b) the first person singular possessor of 'feet' determines
agreement Ii 'lNom' and the clause is ungrammatical. *(31c), in which
the possessor is marked by the accusative agreement morpheme, is also
ungrammatical; however, this follows from the fact that accusative
agreement is inappropriate for unergative subjects (cf. note 14).
Neither can the possessor determine agreement when the body part
is the subject of a transitive clause.
(32) a. Sa-bbak-a-t okwissoshi lhopolli-tok.
lPoss-hand-Dt-Nom window go through-Pst
'My hand went through the window.
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(32) b.*Sa-bbak-a-t okwissoshi Ihopolli-li-tok. 1S
IPoss-hand-Dt-Nom window go through-INom-Pst
('My hand went through the window. ')
c.*Sa-bbak-a-t okwissoshi sa-Ihopolli-tok.
lPoss-hand-Dt-Nom window IAcc-go through-Pst
('My hand went through the window. ')
The ungrammaticality of *(32b) and *(32c) parallels the ungrammaticality
of *(3Ib) and *(31c).
These data point to the fact that possessors can determine agree-
ment only when the body part bears the direct object relation at some
level of structure, perhaps restricted to the initial level. (Due to
the acute semantic peculiarity of such clause, I have found it impossi-
ble to test whether or not possessors of body parts functioning as
initial indirect objects or beneficiaries can determine agreement.)
The same restriction is relevant to the switch reference phenomena.
In those cases in §3 in which the possessor is considered for switch
reference marking, the body part is the subject of an unaccusative
clause, i.e., the body part is initially a direct object. When the body
part is an unergative or transitive subject, switch reference marking
cannot be sensitive to the possessor.
(33) a. Sa-yyi-t hilha-na sa-nayokpa-tok.
lPoss-foot-Nom dance-SR lAcc-happy-Pst
'My feet danced, and I was happy.'
b.*Sa-yyi-t hilha-cha sa-nayokpa-tok.
IPoss-foot-Nom dance-SS IAcc-happy-Pst
('My feet danced, and I was happy. ')
(34) a. Sa-bbak-a-t okwissoshi lhopolli-na yaya-li-tok.
IPoss-hand-Dt-Nom window go through-SR cry-INom-Pst
'My hand went through the window, and I cried.'
b.*Sa-bbak-a-t okwissoshi lhopolli-cha yaya-li-tok.
IPoss-hand-Dt-Nom window go through-SS cry-INom-Pst
('My hand went through the window, and I cried. ')
In both (33) and (34) the subject of one of the clauses is a possessed
body part that is not a direct object at any level of structure. When
SR marking occurs on the first clauses, the sentences are grammatical,
(33a) and (34a), because the rule of SR marking (20b) is satisfied.
When the switch reference rule is sensitive to the possessor, the 5S
marking condition is satisfied; however, when SS marking occurs on the
first clause, the sentences are ungrammatical, *(33b) and *(34b).
Given the above data, the following restriction must be placed on
the extended reference of body parts:
I
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(35) A Choctaw referential coding rule may be sensitive
to the possessor of a body part if and only if the
body part is inalienably possessed and bears the
direct object relation to its clause. 16
Yet to be considered is the question of under what circumstances
each of the options of referential coding is chosen. One might well
hypothesize that given the existence of these options, the various
expressions signal meaning differences, due to either semantic or prag-
matic considerations. Here there appear to be few clearcut answers.
One finds that there is variability between and within speakers and that
explanations are elusive.
However, for one speaker there may be pragmatic conditions which
affect switch reference marking. Consider the sentences in (36).
(36) a. Sa-bbak-a-t
IPoss-hand-Dt-Nom
'My hand hurt, so
hottopa-cha alikchi ia-li-tok.
hurt-SS doctor go-lNom-Pst
I went to the doctor.'
b. Sa-bbak-a-t hottopa-na alikchi ia-li-tok.
IPoss-hand-Dt-Nom hurt-SR doctor go-lNom-Pst
'My hand hurt, so I went to the doctor.'
This speaker reports that (36a) , in which SS marking occurs, is an
appropriate response to the question 'Why did you go to the doctor?',
while (36b) , in which SR marking occurs, is appropriate to the question
'How is your hand?' From this one might hypothesize that SS marking is
more appropriate when the possessor of the body part is the topic of
discourse and SR marking is more appropriate when the body part is topic.
However, as previously stated, this may not hold for all speakers.
Similarly, speakers give alternative translations for clauses when
possessors determine agreement.
(37) a. Sa-noshkobo ish-isso-tok.
IPoss-head 2Nom-hit-Pst
'You hit my head.'
b. Sa-noshkobo
IPoss-head
'You hit my
is-sa-sso-tok.
2Nom-lAcc-hit-Pst
head./You hit me on my head,'
In (37b) we see that the possessor can be given more prominence in the
translation. This signals the fact that when a possessor determines
agreement it is in a position of greater emphasis than when it does not.
In other words, the possessor is conceived of as being more acutely
affected by the action.
Pragmatic accounts of the agreement and switch reference varia-
bility must be considered tentative. However, the results thus far
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indicate that this line of investigation is a viable strategy for re-
searching this question.
5 Conclusion
Studying variability in switch reference in Yuman languages,
Langdon and Munro (1979) describe situations in which switch reference
marking choice cannot be determined solely on syntactic grounds. They
show that options are available to speakers; while there is some indi-
vidual variation (as is the case in the Choctaw data), speakers largely
make choices based on both syntactic and semantic considerations. They
conclude that attempts at either purely semantic or purely syntactic
analyses fail to provide an account of the data. In the same way, the
Choctaw data considered here show that some semantic information
(beyond grammatical information such as person, number, gender, etc.)
must be available to the s)~tactic component for referential coding
phenomena such as verb agreement and switch reference marking.
NOTES
*The Choctaw data presented in this paper were elicited during
field work conducted in southeastern Oklahoma during 1980 and during
work during 1981 and 1982 with a speaker from that area living in San
Diego. This work was supported in part by the National Science Founda-
tion through grant no. BNS 78-17498 to the University of California,
San Diego and by the American Philosophical Society through a Phillips
Fund grant.
1 Choctaw verb agreement has been referrred to as inseparable
pronouns (Byington 1870), echoes (Nicklas 1972; Jacob, Nicklas, and
Spencer 1977) and case affixes (Heath 1977). Additionally, some have
used semantic notions such as actor (Jacob, Nicklas, and Spencer 1977),
agentive (Heath 1977), and patient (Heath 1977; Jacob, Nicklas, and
Spencer 1977) rather than the syntactic notions used here. The syntactic
names used here allow cross-linguistic similarities between Choctaw
verb agreement and nominal case in other languages to be more readily
recognized. Cf. Davies 1981a and note 16 for arguments against a
purely semantic characterization of Choctaw verb agreement.
2 In Davies 1981a I argue that the rules in (1) must
each NP in a clause disjunctively in the order c, b, a, d.
discussion for further details and examples of these rules.
apply to
See that
3 In the presentation of the Choctaw data, I have used certain
digraphs consistent with the generally recognized Choctaw orthography,
i.e., ch /~/, lh = /±/, and sh = /~/. Other consonants and vowels
follow~he IPA.
4 As in many other Amerindian languages, unemphatic pronouns do
not occur in Choctaw utterances. I refer to pronouns here to facilitate
discussion.
5 Third person nominative and accusative agreement morphemes are
0-morphemes.
6 Generally, inalienable possession in Choctaw is marked by one
of a set of prefixes which are nearly identical with the accusative
agreement markers and alieanble possession is marked by one of a set of
prefixes which are nearly identical with the dative agreement markers.
However, certain words which have other uses in the language are marked
by alienable possessive prefixes when functioning as inalienably pos-
sessed body parts or kin terms. The postposition ashaka 'behind' in (8)
and the verb anokfila 'think' in (9) exemplify this.
7 Cf. Davies 1981a for further details of the unaccusative struc-
ture in Choctaw and its interaction with verb agreement.
8 Cf. Davies 1981a, 1982 for more details concerning this struc-
ture.
9 Notice that a possessive prefix copying analysis fails to
account for (16c) since the possessive prefix and the morpheme in the
verbal complex are of distinct types.
10 Cf. Davies 1981a, b for a more detailed discussion of switch
reference in Choctaw.
11 Both translations in (30c) and (30d) are possible, but 'I
hurt, so I went to the doctor' is preferred by most speakers to 'It
hurt, so I went to the doctor'.
12 In this section I use possessor to refer only to possessors
of inalienably possessed body parts.
13 Recall the discussion of the unaccusative and direct object
demotion structures in §2.
14 Since the subject of an unergative clause is a subject at all
levels of structure, it determines nominative agreement following the
rule in (I), as in (i).
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(i) Hilha-li-tok.
dance-lNom-Pst
'I danced. '
15 In Choctaw the subject of a finally transitive clause is a
subject at all levels of structure and therefore determines nominative
agreement, as in (i).
(i) Okwissoshi Ihopolli-li-tok.
window go through-lNom-Pst
'I went through the window. '
16 It may also be possible to formulate this condition in terms
of the notion 'patient', with the generally accepted sense of the
affected NP. However, I have stated the condition in terms of direct
object for two reasons: (1) in Choctaw not all patients are direct
objects, and (ii) grammatical relations are most central to verb agree-
ment and switch reference phenomena.
Although most NP arguments which bear only the semantic role of
patient are initial direct objects in Choctaw, one notable exception is
the verb illi 'die'. The subject of illi is marked by a nominative
agreement morpheme, as in (i). ----
(i) Ish-ill-a:-chI.
2Nom-die-Irr-Fut
'You will die.'
As discussed in §4 (cf. also note 14), intransitive clauses with nomina-
tive agreement marking the subject are unergative, i.e., the subject is
a subject at all levels of structure. This pattern of unergativity also
occurs in existential predicates. Unfortunately, I have no data to
decide the issue of whether or not possessors of body parts which occur
with such predicates can be referenced by verb agreement or switch refer-
ence morphemes.
In the Choctaw literature, the term patient has been used to
describe accusative agreement (Nicklas 1972; Heath 1977; Jacob, NiCklas,
and Spencer 1977). However, this use is somewhat misleading since it
is neither the case that all accusative agreement morphemes reference
patients nor that patients are referenced only by accusative agreement
morphemes. In (ii) both the subject and the direct object are marked
by accusative agreement morphemes.
(ii) Chi-sa-yimmi.
2Acc-lAcc-believe
'I believe you.'
If accusative agreement were to mark only patients, one would have to
claim that both the initial subject 'I' and the initial direct object
'you' are patients in (ii). On the other hand, in (i) the patient is
marked with a nominative morpheme and in direct object demotion clauses
(cf. (14b), (lSb), and (16b» the patient is marked by a dative agree-
ment morpheme.
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